74 ELETTRONICA SICULA (JUDGMENT) Prefect or of the Court of Appeal are equivalent to, or suggest, a conclusion that the requisition was an "arbitrary" action. 124. Yet it must be borne in mind that the fact that an act of a public authority may have been unlawful in municipal law does not necessarily mean that that act was unlawful in international law, as a breach of treaty or otherwise. A finding of the local courts that an act was unlawful may well be relevant to an argument that it was also arbitrary; but by itself, and without more, unlawfulness cannot be said to amount to arbitrariness. It would be absurd if measures later quashed by higher authority or a superior court could, for that reason, be said to have been arbitrary in the sense of international law. To identify arbitrariness with mere unlawfulness would be to deprive it of any useful meaning in its own right. Nor does it follow from a finding by a municipal court that an act was unjustified, or unreasonable, or arbitrary, that that act is necessarily to be classed as arbitrary in international law, though the qualification given to the impugned act by a municipal authority may be a valuable indication. 125. The principal passage from the decision of the Prefect which is relevant here has already been quoted (paragraph 75 above), but it is convenient to set it out again here : "Nonv'ha dubbio che anche sepossono considerarsi, in linea del tutto teorica, sussistenti, nella fattispecie, gli estremi della grave necessità pubblica e della contingibilità ed urgenza che determinarono I'adozione delprovvedimento, ilfine cui tendeva la requisizione non poteva trovare pratica realizzazione con ilprovvedimento stesso, tanto è ver0 che nessuna ripresa di attività dell'azienda vi è stata a seguito della requisizione, nè avrebbe potuto esserci. Manca, pertanto, ne1 provvedimento, genericamente, la causa giuridica chepossa giustificarlo e renderlo operante. " The differing translations offered by the Parties of the sentence upon which the Applicant places considerable reliance are set out in paragraph 123 above. In the Chamber's translation, the passage reads : "There is no doubt that, even though, from the purely theoretical standpoint, the conditions of grave public necessity and of unforeseen urgency warranting adoption of the measure may be considered to exist in the case in point, the intended purpose of the requisition could not in practice be achieved by the order itself, since in fact there was no resumption of the company's activity following the requisition, nor could there have been such resumption. The order therefore