35 any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 91. The Court also underscores that, the elements of the concept of torture established in Article 2 of the Inter-American Convention against Torture include methods to obliterate the personality of the victim in order to attain certain objectives, such as obtaining information from a person; or intimidation or punishment, which may be inflicted through physical violence or through acts that produce severe mental or moral suffering in the victim.81 92. An international juridical regime of absolute prohibition of all forms of torture, both physical and psychological, has been developed and, with regard to the latter, it has been recognized that the threat or real danger of subjecting a person to physical harm produces, under determined circumstances, such a degree of moral anguish that it may be considered “psychological torture.”82. The absolute prohibition of torture, in all its forms, is now part of international jus cogens. 93. Likewise, the Court considers that, according to the circumstances of each particular case, some acts of aggression inflicted on a person may be classified as mental torture, particularly acts that have been prepared and carried out deliberately against the victim to eliminate his mental resistance and force him to accuse himself of or confess to certain criminal conducts, or to subject him to other punishments, in addition to the deprivation of freedom itself.83 94. In the case sub judice, it has been proved that Maritza Urrutia was subjected to acts of mental violence by being exposed intentionally to a context of intense suffering and anguish, according to the practice that prevailed at that time (supra para. 58.4, 58.5 and 58.6). The Court also considers that the acts alleged in this case were prepared and inflicted deliberately to obliterate the victim’s personality and demoralize her, which constitutes a form of mental torture, in violation of Article 5(1) and 5(2) of the Convention to the detriment of Maritza Urrutia. 95. This Court has already had the occasion to apply and declare State responsibility for the violation of the Inter-American Convention against Torture.84 In the instant case, it will exercise its material competence to apply this Convention, which entered into force on February 28, 1987. Articles 1 and 6 of this treaty oblige the States Parties to take all effective measures to prevent and punish all acts of torture within their jurisdiction. 96. The State did not prevent these acts and it did not investigate or punish effectively the torture to which Maritza Urrutia was subjected. Consequently, the 81 Cf. Cantoral Benavides case, supra note 75, para. 100. 82 83 Cf. Cantoral Benavides case, supra note 75, para. 102. Cf. Cantoral Benavides case, supra note 75, para. 104. 84 Cf. The “Street Children” case (Villagrán Morales et al.), supra note 12, para. 249; and the “White Van” case (Paniagua Morales et al.), supra note 12, para. 136.