to bring an appeal for annulment against any regulatory or individual decision by an administrative Authority. Such an appeal must be brought within two (2) months from the date of the publication or notification of the grievance on the one hand, and exceptionally within four (4) months in case of silence from the administration which is interpreted as an implicit dismissal, on the other...". 49. Article 410 of the same Code adds: "Nonetheless, before applying for the annulment of an administrative decision, the interested Party may present, within 2 months, an appeal to a higher or the same administrative Authority to cancel the said decision. In such a case, the application for annulment will only be effective either from the date of the notification of the dismissal of the administrative appeal, or on the expiry of the 4 months stipulated in the Article 408 mentioned above" 50. The Respondent State alleges that in the case under consideration, starting from the date of the notification of the unjustified dismissal of his case by the Minister for Economy, Finance and Budget, the complainant should have, within 2 months, brought an appeal either to the same administrative authority, or to the Head of Government as a higher administrative authority. 51. The Respondent State contends that such an early administrative appeal would have allowed the Complainant to have the negative decision annulled. Otherwise, the Complainant should have secured the real grounds for the dismissal of his claims to allow him make a submission for an annulment at the expiry of the above mentioned deadlines. 52. The Respondent State alleges that since the refusal of the Minister was an administrative decision, the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court was competent to deal with its annulment, in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of law No. 17-99 of 15th April 1999 modifying and supplementing certain provisions of law No. 025-92 of 20th August 1992 and law No. 30-94 of 18th October 1994 governing the organisation and functioning of the Supreme Court. This article stipulates that: "the Supreme Court shall rule on appeals relating to abuses of power lodged against decisions from various authorities". 53. Finally the Respondent State stresses that the Complainant, an attorney by profession, is hardly ignorant of the procedural subtleties of Congolese law and that under the circumstances, he should have submitted his grievances beforehand to the Congolese Courts which have primacy over subsidiary international appeals. 54. The Respondent State concluded that the Complainant did not resort to any internal remedy after the administrative decision rejecting his case and, in consequence, did not comply with one of the essential rules governing the admissibility of communications before the African Commission, namely that of exhaustion of local remedies. 55. All the conditions laid down by Article 56 have been fulfilled by this communication. However, the rule stipulating the exhaustion of local remedies as a requirement for the submission of a communication before the African Commission assumes that the Respondent State should first of all have the opportunity to compensate, by its own means and within the context of its system of domestic law, for any prejudice that may have been caused to an individual. 56. The African Commission, in communications 48/90, 50/91 [52/91] and 89/93 Amnesty International [et] al./Sudan, ruled that all local remedies, if they exist, if they are of a legal nature, are effective and are not subordinate to the discretionary power of the public authorities, should be exhausted. 57. The [African] Commission is of the view that the Complainant has exhausted all local remedies in endeavouring to assert his right to compensation for the prejudice suffered and rejects the Respondent State's claims that he should have appealed against the decision of the Minister before seizing the [African] Commission. 58. The [African] Commission notes that no strict legal provision grants the Minister responsible for the budget any authority to refuse to pay damages which are legally granted. The execution of the judgments made against the Respondent State therefore appears to be subject to the regular procedure provided for in the Administrative Procedure Code (Article 293 and the following ones). 59. Under these circumstances, the question which arises is whether the complainant should have initiated the procedures of forced execution against the Respondent State as provided for by the Administrative Procedure Code. The [African] Commission considers that it is unreasonable to require from a citizen who has won the case of a payable debt against the State at the end of a legal proceedings to institute procedures of seizure against it (assuming that it is possible to resort to this means of imposition against the public authorities). As it happened, the Complainant, having duly notified his judgment to the competent authorities in accordance with the relevant articles of the Administrative Procedure Code, he had a right to expect the immediate execution of his judgment.1 4