37. In its further written submissions on the merits, the Respondent State raised the following points: That the matter has been carefully considered by the South African Courts which found that while the legislations in question did limit Mr Prince's constitutional rights, specifically the right to freedom of religion, such limitations were justifiable under the South African Constitution which allows limitations only in terms of law of general application to the extent that such limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom. Limitations may also take place taking into account all relevant factors, including: 1. The nature of the right; 2. The importance of the purpose of the limitation; 3. The nature and extent of the limitation; 4. The relation between the limitation and its purpose; 5. and the less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. That in considering the matter, the South African Constitutional Court made a careful analysis of the Bill of Rights and struck a careful balance between competing interests in society, while remaining acutely aware of the historical context and unique feature of the South African society of which it is the highest judicial body. That the African Commission should apply extreme care in considering this matter as a determination that will in effect contradict the decision of an esteemed judicial body will inevitably carry seeds of possible conflict between domestic and international legal systems, and will upset the careful balances struck within the young and developing human rights system of member states of the AU. That the South African Courts, in denying Mr Prince's application, and in striking a balance between his rights and the interests of the wider society, did not only do so with South African domestic law in mind, but in the process also took into account the widest possible scope of international law, both customary international law and treaty law, including the African Charter. By using the same international law sources as the South African Courts, the African Commission should come to the same conclusions as that of the South African domestic courts. That, in order to allow the domestic legal system of South Africa co-exist with the African Charter without undue tension, the African Commission should apply the following two methods of interpretation: • The Principle of Subsidiarity which delimits or distributes powers, functions and responsibilities between the state on the one hand, and individuals and groups within the jurisdiction of the state, on the other. Equally, this can be applied to distribute powers between national authorities of State Parties to the African Charter and the African Charter itself. The national authorities should have the initial responsibility to guarantee rights and freedoms within the domestic legal orders of the respective states, and in discharging this duty, should be able to decide on appropriate means of implementation. The African Commission should therefore construct its role as subsidiary, as a narrower and supervisory competence in subsequently reviewing a state's choice of action against the standards set by the provisions of the African Charter. In terms of this construction, the African Commission should not substitute for domestic institutions in the interpretation and application of national law. • The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine, which is the logical result of the application of the principle of subsidiary. It's a discretion that a state's authority is allowed in the implementation and application of domestic human rights norms and standards. This discretion that the state is allowed, rests on its direct and continuous knowledge of its society, its needs, resources, economic and political situation, legal practices, and the fine balance that need to be struck between the competing and sometimes conflicting forces that shape a society. Accordingly, the African Commission, in considering the matter, has to take into account the legal and factual situation in South Africa. It should not view this communication in abstracto, but in the light of the specific circumstances pertaining in the Respondent State. The South African Constitutional Court did take into account such specific circumstances: the ratio for the decision to limit the right to freedom of religion in terms of the Constitution was that the use of cannabis by Rastafari could not be sanctioned without impairing the State's ability to enforce its drug legislation in the interest of the public at large. 4