70. From the record, this Court notes that the District Court exhaustively considered the evidence presented against the Applicant, including the credibility of witnesses particularly the victim of the robbery and his wife, upon whose testimony the Applicant’s conviction hinged. The District Court found the witnesses to be trustworthy, credible and honest. The District Court noted in particular that the accused was not an unknown person to the victim and his wife, and that the moonlight and burning hurricane lamp had facilitated his identification. The District Court concluded that it was satisfied “beyond any peradventure that the accused was the robber on the material night” and that the prosecution had proved their case beyond reasonable doubt. 71. On appeal, the High Court similarly found that in relation to evidence on identification, the testimonies on which the conviction was based were credible. It also found that the Applicant was properly identified and the case was proved to the required standard noting that “the witnesses could not have mistakenly identified the appellant as he as well known to them and as he did not dispute that fact”. The Court of Appeal also reconsidered the identification evidence and concluded that the Applicant had not provided it with material that would warrant setting aside the decision of the High Court. 72. The Court observes that the national courts assessed the circumstances in which the crime was committed and considered the arguments of both the Respondent State and the Applicant, to eliminate possible errors as to the identity of the perpetrator of the robbery. As it emerges from the record, the domestic courts were particularly mindful of the dangers of convicting on the basis of inaccurate identification evidence. 73. The Court finds, therefore, that the manner in which the domestic courts evaluated the evidence leading to the Applicant’s conviction does not disclose any manifest error(s) and was not tainted with injustice to the detriment of the Applicant. Accordingly, the Court holds that there are no grounds for interfering with the reasonings of the domestic courts. 18