00t03E
il
.l .
r,
-r$*:;*
:
CRIET ignores the principles of a fwo-fier jurisdiction and is a violation of his riqht to
r
fair trial" [paragraph 209. ltalics
*
.* .':-F.
added].
Slf
10. ln determining these issues, the Court finds that "the provisions of Article 19 (2)
of the law establishing CRIET is a violation by the Respondent State of the right of the
Applicant to challenge the declaration of guilt and his sentence by a higher court
[paragraph 215. ltalics added].
1. Here the fact is, the Applicant seems to be contradicting himself by contending on
the one hand, that the judgement of the Court of First lnstance, First Class of Cotonou
dated 4 November 2016 granting his acquittal on the benefit of the doubt is itself not
subject to any appeal and that it is a resiudicatalparagraphs 125 -127l,and on the
other hand, as this was stated earlier, that the law establishing CRIET prevents him
from going on appeal against the decision of the latter which sentenced him to a twenty
year term. ln the face of such a situation, in my opinion, the Court ought to have taken
note of this contradiction, and finally decided that what is at stake here is not the nglhfs
of the Applicant himself to a two{ier jurisdiction, but the law establishing CR/Ef, in its
Article 19 (2) and make findings on the inconsistency of this provision with Article 14
(5) of the lnternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), without
considering the peculiar situation of the Applicant2.
1
12. Failing to do so, the Court finds a violation which does not exist [paragraph 215].
The Court should rather have drawn an appropriate conclusion, that through Article 19
(2) of the law establishing CRIET, the Respondent State violated Article 14 (5) of the
ICCPR.
13. Lastly, the situation is not different regarding the allegation of violation of the duty
incumbent on the Respondent State to guarantee the independence of the judiciary.
On this issue, the Applicant complains about the language used by the Head of State
[paragraph 275], as well as the language used by the Charg6 de mission at the
Presidency of the Republic and by the Minister of Justice [paragraph 276].
'14.
While dealing with these allegations, the Court finds that there is violation of the
obligation of the Respondent State to guarantee the independence of the judiciary by
relying only on the statements of the Minister of Justice [paragraphs 281 and 282l.ln
so doing, the Court fails to explain why it does not discuss and does not also take into
consideration the statements made by the Head of State (which as a matter of fact
have not been put in the passage), as well as the statements made by the Charg6 de
mission at the Presidency of the Republic.
15 ln my opinion, the Court should also have reflected the impugned statements made
by the Head of State, and ought to have decided in one way or the other on how they
affect the independence of the judiciary and should have proceeded in the same
manner to deal with the statements made by the Charg6 de mission in question. This
2lt
is well known in this regard that in the Charter system, the Applicant is not required to prove a
personal interest in having a locus standi. See especially: African Commrssion on Human and Peoples'
Rights, Communication 27712003 Brian Spilg et alt. Botswana, paragraphs 73- 85, and the
jurisprudence cited.
6-
3
^